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Abstract. It is the purpose of this research to present some estimates of human capital 
earnings functions for Portugal, using published data on mean earnings by age, education 
and sex. We provide estimates of the implicit rates of return to human capital - schooling 
and general O.J.T. Differential effects by sex are discussed. An application of the 
methodology is used to analyze returns differentials between different schooling categories. 
Research on the specification of the earnings-experience profiles is also performed.  
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1. Introduction  
he acquisition of human capital through education and On-The-Job 
Training has been generally viewed as an investment. After major 
developments in the theory - in which Schultz, Becker and Mincer 
have been pioneers -, a substantial number of empirical papers have been 
produced intending to highlight the features of such an investment. 
It is the purpose of this research to use available Portuguese cross-
section information on earnings, schooling and an indirect measure of 
experience of the working population to 
1. offer some estimates of the pattern of the (human capital) rates of 
return to schooling and general On-the-Job-Training. 
2. illustrate some possible applications of the methodology used, namely 
in discrimination issues and evaluation of the results of some education 
policies 1. 
3. infer some aspects of the current equilibrium in the Portuguese 
human capital market by comparison with international evidence. 
We start by introducing the reader to some theoretical background in 
section II. In section III we present and discuss the log-earnings regression 
results for the male population. In section IV we analyze the male-female 
differentials in the implied pattern of compensation. Section V deals with 
the comparison of the general high-school with the extinct technical school 
system. Further extensions of the specifications of sections III and IV to 
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include higher degree polynomial terms in experience are presented in 
section VI. Some final remarks are put forward in section VII. We conclude 
by summarizing the main results in section VIII. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
1. An individual has a potential working life of T+1 years. Assume that if 
he chooses 0 years of schooling, he will earn (in real terms) E
0
t
 from t=0 to 
T; if he chooses s years, he will earn E
s
t
, from t=s to T, incurring in costs C
s
t
, 
during the schooling period, t = 0 to s-1. Then, the internal rate of return to 
human capital will be given by the rate r that equates: 
 

T
t=0
  E
0
t
 /(1+r)t  =  - 
s-1
t=0
  C
s
t
 /(1+r)t  +  
T
t=s
  E
s
t
 /(1+r)t    (1.1) 
 
The individual will choose to go to school if the rate of return to the 
human capital investment is higher than the borrowing rate he faces. Now, 
assume that money costs are zero - only opportunity costs in the use of 
time are involved in going to school 2- and that the earnings streams are 
constant for both options - E
0
 and E
s
. Then, for T   we obtain 3: 
 
E
0
 {1/[1-1/(1+r)]}  =  E
s
 {1/[1-1/(1+r)]} / (1+r)s     (1.2) 
 
Thus: 
 
E
s
  =  (1+r)s  E
0
          (1.3) 
 
Taking logarithms: 
 
ln E
s
  =  ln E
0
 + s log(1+r)        (1.4) 
 
By Taylor's expansion and small values of r, log(1+r)  r. The 
approximation to the rate of return to schooling can therefore be 4: 
 
ln E
s
  =  ln E
0
 + s r         (1.5) 
 
If we use Taylor's expansion to a higher order term, we can get: 
 
ln E
s
  =  a0 + a1 s + a2 s
2+ a3 s
3 + ...       (1.6) 
 
A possible interpretation of the derivative of the expression with respect 
to s is the rate of return to human capital at each level of schooling 5. 
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d(ln E
s
)/ ds = r(s)         (1.7) 
 
For example, if we take only to the term education squared, 
 
d(ln E
s
)/ ds = a1 + 2 a2 s       (1.8) 
 
Then, a value of a1 > 0 and of a2 < 0 will imply a diminishing rate of 
return to education. 
Notice that we can therefore estimate the rate of return to human capital 
in an economy if we have (cross-section) data on earnings of individuals of 
different schooling years by simply regressing the logarithms of earnings 
on the schooling period. 
2. In terms of interpretation, the rate in (1.1) through (1.5) - and the one 
we get from the regression (1.5) - is the equilibrium rate of the economy.  
Psacharopoulos (1981) reports estimates of the average private rate of 
return from log-earnings regressions of 14,4% for the LDC's, 9,7% for 
intermediate countries and 7,7% for advanced countries6; the ranking of 
those rates seems to be maintained, as suggested by later surveys 
(Psacharopoulos 1985 and 1994). This would imply underinvestment in 
human capital in less advanced economies, being the basis for public 
support of the education systems - not only due to external effects 
associated with it but simply due to the major difficulty in access to credit 
for the investment. That is, people find it difficult to get credit from the 
bank to subsidize their schooling years, once there is no guarantee (or 
knowledge of the future intentions of the individual - usually he has no 
credit history) to the bank of the future payment of an eventual loan. 
Empirical findings also suggest a declining rate as the level of schooling 
increases. This could be related to decreasing credit constraints. That is, 
individuals will engage in schooling if the rate of return to the investment 
is at least equal to the borrowing rate they face. Therefore, people that face 
lower interest rates will have higher levels of schooling. The observed 
equilibrium pattern would then be of a declining rate of return to schooling 
relative to the schooling level. Also, people who acquire more schooling 
may have relatively higher "taste for studying" - implying they receive 
utility from studying, compensating, in equilibrium, the smaller money-
yielding returns of people that choose smaller schooling levels. 
3. Apart from the investment in (general) human capital through 
schooling, the enhancement of the ability to earn may be acquired through 
On-the-Job Training (O.J.T.). Let t denote experience in the labor market, k0 
be the proportion of earnings potential (or time-equivalent units) invested 
at time 0 in the market and T the experience level till which investment is 
made. Then, if the ratio of investment to earnings potential declines linearly 
7 , we can write the natural logarithm of the observed earnings for 
experience level t and schooling s, Y
s
t as: 
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ln Y
s
t
 = ln E
0
 + s r + rt k0 t - (rt k0/2T) t
2 + ln(1-k0 +k0 t/T)    (1.9) 
 
An approximation to the pattern of earnings profiles will be obtained if 
we regress: 
 
ln Y
s
t
 = a0 + a1 s + b1 t + b2 t
2              (1.10) 
 
If the proportion of potential earnings invested declines exponentially 
and at a rate b, (in which case there is investment through all the lifetime), 
we arrive to the Gompertz specification 8: 
 
ln Y
s
t
 = ln E
0
 + s r + rt k0/b - (rtk0/b) e
-bt + ln(1-k0 e
-bt)           (1.11) 
 
Then, an approximation of the function can be obtained through the 
regression 
 
ln Y
s
t
 = a0 + a1 s + b1 e
-bt + b2 e
-2bt ,             (1.12) 
 
where  
 
b1 = - (k0 + rt k0/b) ,    and              (1.13) 
b2 = - (k0
2/2) .                (1.14) 
 
Assume we have data on earnings, experience and schooling. For 
specific levels of b, e-bt and e-2bt can be computed and simple linear 
regression can yield estimates for a0, a1, b1, and b2. 
4. If in expression (1.1) we enter private expenditure and (net or after-
tax) returns, then we will obtain the private rate of return to education. If 
we considered the gross returns and effective implied total (public and 
private) expenditure with education, we talk about social returns to 
education. In practice, it has been observed that the actual social rate 
estimated for other countries is lower than the private one, due to the 
subsidization of schooling all over the world.  
Notice that this seems somehow odd. In theory, social rates should be 
higher than private rates whenever there are positive externalities coming 
from a particular investment. In fact, the opposite has been observed; this 
occurs because in the actual estimates of social rates we do not include - 
because they are very difficult to measure - external benefits (and indirect 
costs). 
Estimates of the social and private internal rates of return to schooling 
for different education levels using cost-benefit analysis - that is, for 
specific (adjacent) schooling categories for which there is data on labor 
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income streams for people in different years in working lifetime - have 
already been obtained for Portugal 9 . We will use the same data, and 
combine information on age to derive experience levels and take the log-
earnings approach to infer about the structure of the rates of return.  
Some estimates of rates of return to education for Portugal using log 
earnings regressions were derived in Silva (1985), and more recently, in 
Kiker & Santos (1991 and 1997). They use different data sets and our 
methodology differs from theirs in several ways - namely in the 
differentials approach followed, the experience coefficients interpretations, 
age group decomposition of profiles and the extensions here considered - 
and also, in some questions we aim to answer. 
 
3. Rates of return to human capital: Male population 
1. In Table II.1 we reproduce some regressions of the log of monthly 
earnings on schooling and experience for the Portuguese male sample (see 
Appendix 1 for a description of the sample and data used). 
Equation (1) refers to the estimates of equation (1.5) and equation (2) to 
those of (1.10). Equation (2). implies a rate of 7,3%. This rate is somewhat 
smaller than the one derived in Silva (1985) - whose estimates ranged 
between 9,1 and 9,3% -, or Kiker & Santos (1991). For the U.S.10, Mincer 
(1974) obtained (for data of 1959) a higher level: 10,3% 11. However, for the 
Nordic countries, much smaller rates than ours seem to have been found 12. 
The relation between log of earnings and experience in (2) suggests that 
a peak is reached at experience level of 27 years - 34 years for the U.S. 
Equation (3) allows for a second-order term in the coefficient of 
education and an interdependence between experience and education, that 
is, r(s,t) is of the form  
 
r(s,t) = d(ln E
s
t
)/ ds = a1 + 2 a2 s + a3 t              (2.1) 
 
The corresponding estimates yield: 
 
r(s,t) = d(ln E
s
t
)/ ds = 0,099 + 0,002 s - 0,001 t              (2.2) 
 
This implies - as we can see in Table II.2 - a convex profile for log of 
earnings with respect to schooling, contrary to what was found for other 
countries (diminishing rates of return). However, a2 is not significant at the 
5% significance level (although it is at 10%), thus suggesting that the rate of 
return is independent of the schooling level. 
The interaction between experience and schooling is significantly 
negative - the same having been reported for the U.S.13, for which: 
 
r(s,t) = d(ln E
s
t
)/ ds = 0,255 - 0,0058 s - 0,0043 t             (2.3) 
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Table II.1. Human Capital Earnings Functions: Men 
Regres. Int. Educ Educ2 Exp Exp2 Exp*Edu e-.05xt e-2*.05xt 
(1) 8.83 0.065       
  (0.003)       
 N = 392  R2 = 0.52 F = 422.3 SSR = 36.304 
(2) 8.02 0.073  0.054 -0.001    
  (0.002)  (0.002) (3.8E-5)    
 N = 392  R2 = 0.87 F = 884.5 SSR = 9.646 
(3) 7.64 0.099 0.001 0.076 -0.001 -0.001   
  (0.006) (2.8E-4) (0.003) (3.6E-5) (1.1E-4)   
 N = 392  R2 = 0.91 F = 793.9 SSR = 6.702 
(4) 9.69 0.075  -0.013   -1.5 -0.384 
  (0.002)  (0.004)   (0.489) (0.313) 
 N = 392  R2 = 0.89 F = 759.7 SSR = 8.542 
(5) 9.79 0.053 0.001 -0.014   -1.591 -0.327 
  (0.005) (2.9E-4) (0.004)   (0.477) (0.305) 
 N = 392  R2 = 0.89 F = 643.5 SSR = 8.1 
 
Taking s=0, the maximum earnings are obtained at 38 years, very close 
to the implied level for the U.S. - 41 years. 
2. Several Gompertz specifications were tried - with b from 0,05 to 0,30. 
The best results (adjusted R2) were obtained for the smallest rates - 0,05 
and 0,10. For the U.S., the best results corresponded to values of 0,10 and 
0,15 - the rate of decline would seem to be slightly lower in Portugal.  
We report the estimates corresponding to 0,05, once they resulted in 
meaningful signs for the interpretations implied in (1.13) and (1.14). That is, 
we have implied estimates of general O.J.T. rates of return (rt) and the 
initial proportion of earnings capacity devoted to training (k0). In the 
regression we also included experience, which coefficient is interpreted as 
the depreciation rate of human capital 14. 
 
Table II.2. Implicit Rates of Return to Human Capital Investments: Men. (%) 
 rs by Years of Schooling k0 T rx d 
Regression  0 4 6 9 11 16  (years)   
(2) 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 74.0 27   
(3)           
Exp.           
0 9.9 10.7 11.1 11.7 12.1 13.1  38   
5 9.4 10.2 10.6 11.2 11.6 12.6  38   
10 8.9 9.7 10.1 10.7 11.1 12.1  38   
20 7.9 8.7 9.1 9.7 10.1 11.1  38   
30 6.9 7.7 8.1 8.7 9.1 10.1  38   
40 5.9 5.7 7.1 7.7 8.1 9.1  38   
50 4.9 4.7 6.1 6.7 7.1 8.1  38   
(4) 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 87.6  13.6 1.3 
(5) 5.3 6.1 6.5 7.1 7.5 8.5 80.9  14.8 1.4 
 
The numbers (Tables II.1 and II.2) suggest that the initial investment is 
very high - 80 to 88%. (Also, for the U.S., for b = 0,10, k0 = 56%; for b = 0,15, 
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k0 = 81%). The rate of return to O.J.T. is rather high: 13,6-14,8% (for the U.S., 
for b = 0,10, rt = 13,1%; for b = 0,15, rt = 6,7%). The depreciation rate is 1,3-
1,4%. (1,2% for the U.S.) 
The Portuguese schooling profile - equation (5) - is again convex. There 
would seem to be underinvestment at high schooling levels15, or more 
important signaling effects for increasing schooling levels in Portugal. 
 
Table II.3. Human Capital Earnings Functions by Age Group: Men. 
Age Group Int. Educ Educ2 Exp Exp2 Exp*Educ 
14-24 7.32 0.121  0.083 4.60E-4  
  (0.007)  (0.016) (0.001)  
 N = 66 R2 = 0.845  F = 112.5 SSR = 1.399 
14-24 5.83 0.332 -0.007 0.338 -0.009 -0.018 
  (0.051) (0.002) (0.053) (0.002) (0.004) 
 N = 66 R2 = 0.892  F = 99.34 SSR = 0.971 
25-34 8.04 0.083  0.046 -3.90E-4  
  (0.004)  (0.009) (2.70E-4)  
 N = 80 R2 = 0.893  F = 212.4 SSR = 0.657 
25-34 7.24 0.137 -0.001 0.123 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.071) (0.002) (0.067) (0.001) (0.003) 
 N = 80 R2 = 0.899  F = 131.5 SSR = 0.623 
35-44 8.9 0.068  -0.003 1.82E-4  
  (0.004)  (0.012) (2.28E-4)  
 N = 80 R2 = 0.94  F = 394.5 SSR = 0.469 
35-44 9.39 0.011 0.002 -0.024 3.86E-4 0.001 
  (0.084) (0.001) (0.08) (0.001) (0.002) 
 N = 80 R2 = 0.943  F = 243.7 SSR = 0.445 
45-54 9.51 0.069  -0.031 4.69E-4  
  (0.005)  (0.021) (2.98E-4)  
 N = 80 R2 = 0.916  F = 277.5 SSR = 0.798 
45-54 10.15 -0.002 0.002 -0.051 0.001 0.001 
  (0.143) (0.002) (0.136) (0.002) (0.003) 
 N = 80 R2 = 0.92  F = 169.6 SSR = 0.766 
55-65 10.72 0.051  -0.058 4.78E-4  
  (0.007)  (0.039) (4.22E-4)  
 N = 86 R2 = 0.807  F = 114.1 SSR = 2.129 
55-65 9.69 0.089 -3.33E-4 -0.02 1.29E-4 -0.001 
  (0.231) (0.002) (0.217) (0.002) (0.004) 
 N = 86 R2 = 0.807  F = 66.81 SSR = 2.128 
 
Also, experience profiles would seem to have peaks at the same level of 
experience - being, of course, lower but also flatter in Portugal 16. 
3. Table II.3 presents the regression results of the log-earnings equations 
of linearly decreasing investment in h.c. through O.J.T. - that is, of form (2) 
and (3) of tables II.1 and II.2. We were trying to see whether different 
cohorts might result in different regression patterns.  
One of the results implied - comparing results of form (2) - is a 
decreasing rate of return to schooling by age group, from 12,1% for people 
aged 14-24 to 5,1% for people aged 55-65. This reminds us of the negative 
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coefficient, found for the total population in the U.S., of (2.3). It may be 
related to nonlinear depreciation of human capital. Usually, the experience 
profile shows switched signs relative to the US results- even if one of the 
coefficients is, in general, not statistically significant for Portugal. 
Simultaneously, the intercept, associated with earnings at level 0 of 
schooling, consistently increases. This would suggest that somehow for 
older cohorts the returns to education are lower but individuals start(ed) at 
higher levels of earnings. Whether compensation patterns are more related 
to age than experience (or tenure - or compensation "rules" in implicit 
contracting terms), it is difficult to measure here, once our proxy uses age 
and education (we cannot distinguish the effects of age and experience). 
Possibly, compensation patterns are also more diffuse (less disperse and, 
thus, less dependent on schooling levels) at higher age levels. 
The performance of form (3), allowed us to get "correct" signs - as 
compared to the U.S. - of the parameters for ages 14-34. The "wrong" signs 
of some coefficients for the group aged 35-44 years are not significant. And 
for the last two groups the results for this regression were usually poor, 
suggesting, rather a form of type (2). 
The results relative to the experience terms led us to believe about the 
convenience of experimenting with higher order polynomials in t - 
performed in section V. There is, nevertheless, some reason to believe that 
different cohorts, which made their decision in the past, may have suffered 
different economic and schooling conditions, which somehow may have 
influenced the set of results thus obtained. (This consideration is not the 
same as those made in the cohort differentials literature, usually associated 
with differences in the returns to schooling in different points in time17.) 
 
4. Male-female earnings differentials 
1. In Tables III.1 to III.2 we present the results for women equivalent to 
those of Table II.1 to II.2. The quality of the estimation is, in general, poorer 
than for men, as expected: the female labor force is usually characterized by 
a break in participation in the fertility period, which, with the 
corresponding depreciation in human capital, makes the use of the proxy 
for experience as calculated a little inapplicable. Therefore, more interesting 
- correct - conclusions might be drawn from the cohort disaggregation (here 
much more than in the male case). 
 
Table III.1. Human Capital Earnings Functions: Women. 
Regres.  Int. Educ Educ2 Exp Exp2 Ex*Edu e-.05xt e-2*.05xt 
(1) 8.61 0.07       
  (0.003)       
 N = 308  R2 = 0.64 F = 533.8 SSR = 17.819 
(2) 8.05 0.08  0.033 -4.13E-4    
  (0.002)  (0.003) (4.7E-5)    
 N = 308  R2 = 0.81 F = 425.5 SSR = 9.407 
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(3) 7.78 0.11 -0.001 0.047 -0.001 -0.001   
  (0.01) (4.5E-4) (0.004) (5.6E-5) (2.0E-4)   
 N = 308  R2 = 0.82 F = 275.1 SSR = 8.805 
(4) 8.86 0.081  -0.003   -0.476 -0.52 
  (0.002)  (0.005)   (0.663) (0.441) 
 N = 308  R2 = 0.82 F = 335 SSR = 9.012 
(5) 8.88 0.078 2.21E-4 -0.003   -0.484 -0.517 
  (0.007) (4.2E-4) (0.005)  (0.664) (0.442)  
 N = 308  R2 = 0.82 F = 267.7 SSR = 9.004 
 
The implied estimates of rates of return to schooling are usually higher 
for women than men. This would correspond - the estimated rate is the 
prevailing equilibrium rate - to less women with advanced schooling than 
men. Women would deter from going to school, which would drive their 
rate of return up. Or, signaling effects of schooling are stronger for women 
than for men. The fact is that lately, women seem to have entered the 
education systems in at least equal number as men, suggesting a response 
to that high rate of return.  
Other studies of human capital earnings functions for Portugal did not 
find such a relation between rates of return to human capital for men and 
women, but rather the inverse - for example, Silva (1985) found rates 
between 8,4 and 9,0% for women while (recall from section II) rates of 9,1 to 
9,3% for men in similar regressions. That is also an unusual finding in 
contrast with some international evidence, where female rates of return are 
usually lower than men's 18  - being such evidence in favor of the 
discrimination hypothesis. Nevertheless other international surveys report 
– see Psacharopoulos (1994) - report the pattern here presented; Kiker & 
Santos (1991), using 1985 data, also find such result for Portugal. 
 
Table III.2. Implicit Rates of Return to Human Capital Investments: Women. (%) 
 rs by Years of Schooling k0 T rx d 
Regression  0 4 6 9 11 16  (years)   
(2) 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 41.3 40   
(3) Years of 
Experience: 
          
0 11.0 10.2 9.8 9.2 8.8 7.8  24   
5 10.5 9.7 9.3 8.7 8.3 7.3  24   
10 10.0 9.2 8.8 8.2 7.8 6.8  24   
20 9.0 8.2 7.8 7.2 6.8 5.8  24   
30 8.0 7.2 6.8 6.2 5.8 4.8  24   
40 7.0 6.2 5.8 5.2 4.8 3.8  24   
50 6.0 5.2 4.8 4.2 3.8 2.8  24   
(4) 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 102.0  7.33 0.3 
(5) 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.5 101.7  7.38 0.3 
 
The other distinguishing feature relative to males is the "correct signs" 
relative to the U.S. (male population).  
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Table III.3. Human Capital Earnings Functions by Age Group: Women. 
Age Group Int. Educ Educ2 Exp Exp2 Exp*Educ 
14-24 7.28 0.138  0.063 0.001  
  (0.008)  (0.017) (0.001)  
 N = 54 R2 = 0.873  F = 114.3 SSR = 0.94 
14-24 6.44 0.213 -0.001 0.236 -0.006 -0.01 
  (0.061) (0.002) (0.057) (0.002) (0.004) 
 N = 54 R2 = 0.919  F = 108.4 SSR = 0.601 
25-34 8.15 0.083  0.024 -1.98E-4  
  (0.005)  (0.011) (3.32E-4)  
 N = 72 R2 = 0.886  F = 175.7 SSR = 0.822 
25-34 9.57 -0.049 0.003 -0.093 0.002 0.005 
  (0.088) (0.002) (0.083) (0.002) (0.004) 
 N = 72 R2 = 0.889  F = 106.2 SSR = 0.795 
35-44 7.67 0.084  0.059 -0.001  
  (0.007)  (0.03) (0.001)  
 N = 68 R2 = 0.834  F = 107.3 SSR = 1.391 
35-44 11.22 -0.097 0.002 -0.162 0.003 0.006 
  (0.17) (0.003) (0.167) (0.003) (0.005) 
 N = 68 R2 = 0.842  F = 65.86 SSR = 1.329 
45-54 8.62 0.071  0.005 -5.77E-5  
  (0.01)  (0.044) (0.001)  
 N = 66 R2 = 0.766  F = 67.53 SSR = 2.214 
45-54 12.25 -0.001 -0.001 -0.181 0.002 0.002 
  (0.288) (0.004) (0.272) (0.003) (0.007) 
 N = 66 R2 = 0.781  F = 42.72 SSR = 2.073 
55-65 9.73 0.078  -0.049 0.001  
  (0.012)  (0.07) (0.001)  
 N = 48 R2 = 0.742  F = 42.23 SSR = 1.951 
55-65 12.12 0.096 -0.002 -0.151 0.002 2.42E-4 
  (0.382) (0.004) (0.378) (0.004) (0.007) 
 N = 48 R2 = 0.754  F = 25.72 SSR = 1.864 
 
The experience profiles are, as expected, flatter for women than for men; 
our proxy for experience, however, extremely overestimates the true 
experience of women - once they may have non-participating periods much 
larger than men - and, possibly, increasingly with the age group 
considered, once female participation has increased over the years. Even if 
this was not the case, implicit contracting, due to the smaller attachment of 
women to the labor market, may cause "true" experience profiles to be 
flatter for women. 
 
Table III.4. Human Capital Earnings Functions: Sex Differentials. 
Age Group/ 
Regression 
Sex Sex*Educ Sex*Exp FTest1* FTest2** FTest3*** 
All (1) -0.227 0.005  39.50 - 39.50 
 (0.041) (0.005)  (2, 696) - (2, 696) 
 N = 700 R2 = 0.603  F = 352.3 SSR = 54.12 
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All (2) -0.12 0.006 -0.004 71.58 27.93 62.75 
 (0.04) (0.003) (0.001) (3, 693) (1, 692) (4, 692) 
 N = 700 R2 = 0.855  F = 678.8 SSR = 19.82 
All (3) -0.086 0.005 -0.005 97.11 14.83 58.89 
 (0.037) (0.003) (0.001) (3, 691) (3, 688) (6, 688) 
 N = 700 R2 = 0.879  F = 626.8 SSR = 16.51 
All (4) -0.125 0.006 -0.004 78.86 13.31 54.32 
 (0.038) (0.003) (0.001) ((3, 692) (2, 690) (5, 690) 
 N = 700 R2 = 0.866  F = 640.3 SSR = 18.23 
All (5) -0.13 0.007 -0.004 79.39 10.54 46.61 
 (0.038) (0.003) (0.001) (3, 691) (3, 688) (6, 688) 
 N = 700 R2 = 0.869  F = 571.8 SSR = 17.89 
Notes: * Testing the joint hypothesis of null sex dummies. ** Comparison of the regression with freeing 
all parameters (that is, against the hypothesis of different regressions for men and women). *** 
Comparison of Regression without sex dummies against the hypothesis of different regressions for men 
and women (Chow test). 
 
Therefore, we see that the rate of return to experience in the Gompertz 
specification is much lower than for men. 
 
Table III.5.1. Human Capital Earnings Functions: Sex Differentials. 
Age Group/ 
Regression 
Sex Sex*Educ Sex*Exp FTest1* FTest2** FTest3*** 
14-24 (1) -0.087 0.018 -0.007 4.90 0.34 3.73 
 (0.136) (0.01) (0.01) (3, 113) (1, 112) (4, 112) 
 N = 120 R2 = 0.857  F = 112.8 SSR = 2.346 
14-24 (2) -0.169 0.024 -0.002 7.95 1.99 4.98 
 (0.116) (0.009) (0.008) (3, 111) (3, 108) (6, 108) 
 N = 120 R2 = 0.899  F = 123.8 SSR = 1.652 
25-34 (1) 0.074 -0.001 -0.016 44.94 0.19 33.57 
 (0.138) (0.007) (0.006) (3, 145) (1, 144) (4, 144) 
 N = 152 R2 = 0.902  F = 222.6 SSR = 1.481 
25-34 (2) 0.062 -8.59E-5 -0.015 44.53 1.38 23.14 
 (0.138) (0.007) (0.006) (3, 143) (3, 140) (6, 140) 
 N = 152 R2 = 0.903  F = 167.3 SSR = 1.46 
35-44 (1) -0.568 0.017 0.008 51.36 3.69 40.17 
 (0.229) (0.008) (0.007) (3, 141) (1, 140) (6, 140) 
 N = 148 R2 = 0.903  F = 218.0 SSR = 1.909 
35-44 (2) -0.567 0.017 0.008 50.29 2.64 27.74 
 (0.231) (0.008) (0.007) (3, 139) (3, 136) (6, 136) 
 N = 148 R2 = 0.904  F = 163.1 SSR = 1.888 
Notes: * Testing the joint hypothesis of null sex dummies. ** Comparison of the regression with freeing 
all parameters (that is, against the hypothesis of different regressions for men and women). *** 
Comparison of regression without sex dummies against the hypothesis of different regressions for men 
and women (Chow test). 
 
By age group, we see the same pattern for women and men in what 
refers to the returns to schooling - specification (2) also shows a decreasing 
rate by age group, starting at 14% for the 14-24 years group and being 7-8% 
for the 45-65 years group. The estimates of the experience coefficients have 
very large standard errors. 
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Table III.5.2. Human Capital Earnings Functions: Sex Differentials 
Age Group/ 
Regression 
Sex Sex*Educ Sex*Exp FTest1* FTest2** FTest3*** 
45-54 (1) -0.246 0.001 -0.001 41.96 0.73 31.59 
 (0.384) (0.01) (0.009) (3, 139) (1, 138) (4, 138) 
 N = 146 R2 = 0.87  F = 154.4 SSR = 3.028 
45-54 (2) -0.23 0.001 -0.001 41.46 2.67 22.83 
 (0.388) (0.01) (0.009) (3, 155) (3, 134) (6, 134) 
 N = 146 R2 = 0.87  F = 114.9 SSR = 3.009 
55-65 (1) -1.142 0.028 0.016 15.37 0.03 11.44 
 (0.567) (0.013) (0.01) (3, 127) (1, 126) (4, 126) 
 N = 134 R2 = 0.824  F = 98.81 SSR = 4.081 
55-65 (2) -1.067 0.025 0.014 15.05 0.63 7.77 
 (0.575) (0.013) (0.011) (3, 125) (3, 122) (6, 122) 
 N = 134 R2 = 0.825  F = 73.52 SSR = 4.054 
Notes: * Testing the joint hypothesis of null sex dummies. ** Comparison of the regression with freeing 
all parameters (that is, against the hypothesis of different regressions for men and women). *** 
Comparison of regression without sex dummies against the hypothesis of different regressions for men 
and women (Chow test). 
 
2. A set of tests were performed trying to evaluate the significance of the 
difference between female and male earnings. The method involves the use 
of sex-dummies (Sexi=1 if i refers to woman, 0 if man). The results are 
presented in Tables III.4 and III.5. In general, and as expected, different 
regressions are advisable for the two sexes. 
A negative coefficient is found for Sex. In logarithms, the difference 
found corresponds - approximately - to the percentage difference of 
women's earnings relative to the men's level. Thus, the sex-dummy (Table 
III.4) reads a 22,7% wage differential between women and men - the initial 
earnings start at a level 22,7% lower than that of men. As we include more 
explanatory variables, this differential decreases to 12% (formulation (2)) 
and 8,6% with formulation (3). The Gompertz specification indicates a 
value of 13%. 
In the age-group decomposition, the sex-dummy yields maximum 
differentials for women 55-65 and 35-44, being lower at young ages, and 
higher for older women. As expected, results worsen with the cohorts´age; 
it is possible that the situation has improved in more recent periods: some 
of the differentials of earlier years may have persisted even if not affecting 
posterior earnings growth. 
The sex dummy interacted with education yields a positive bias in favor 
of women, which was already discussed. The differential is negative for 
ages 25-34, but not significant. Simultaneously, the bias is negative with 
respect to experience. Again, differentials may be overstated due to the 
experience proxy used, specially if education and ("true") experience are 
positively correlated - which we cannot measure with the data we have 
available: then, part of the (positive) influence would be captured in the 
education coefficient for women.  
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Finally, different specifications are advisable for men and women - not 
only for both separately (from FTest2 in table III.4, we conclude that just 
including the dummies is not enough to account for the differences), but 
also, as we will see below, higher order polynomial forms may fit the data 
more accurately. 
3. Discrimination studies usually decompose the wage gap between men 
and women in the following way19: 
 
WF - WM = (ZF -ZM) BF + (BF-BM) ZF      (3.1) 
 
where Zj refers a vector of (mean) levels of productivity characteristics 
(say, schooling and experience) of an individual of group j and Bj the 
coefficients representing the contribution of those characteristics to the 
determination of the productivity of group j. Alternatively, we can write: 
 
WF - WM = (ZF -ZM) BM + (BF-BM) ZM      (3.2) 
 
The first term evaluates the differences of the values of the Z's at the 
price of women in (3.1) and of men in (3.2). The second term, evaluates the 
sex price differential at the value of the women's set of characteristics in 
(3.1), and of men's in (3.2). This second term is, thus a measure of market 
discrimination. 
We have no information on the mean levels of the characteristics for the 
male and female samples. We can, however, construct the series of 
differentials in earnings for given characteristics - schooling and 
experience. We can infer the dimension of those second coefficients, i.e., the 
price differentials, through the regression: 
 
(WFi - WMi) = (BF-BM) ZMi = BF-M ZMi      (3.3) 
 
where i refers to a specific level of schooling and experience. We can 
therefore see how the prices differ for each category, that is, estimate the 
vector BF-M. We performed several regressions of the earnings differentials 
on the characteristics available. We used Wji, j=F,M, in logarithms, to 
conform with the previous results - also, the estimated price differences, 
captured in the intercept and in the coefficients, have the advantage of 
allowing an interpretation in percentage difference terms. 
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Table III.6.1. Female-Male Earnings Differentials. (%) 
 Years of Schooling 
Experience: 0 4 6 9 11 14 16 
0 10,2 7,8 6,6 4,8 3,6 1,8 0,6 
5 12,7 10,3 9,1 7,3 6,1 4,3 3,1 
10 15,2 12,7 11,6 9,8 8,6 6,8 5,6 
20 20,2 17,8 16,6 14,8 13,6 11,8 10,6 
30 25,2 22,8 21,6 19,8 18,6 16,8 15,6 
40 30,2 27,8 26,6 24,8 23,6 21,8 20,6 
50 35,2 32,8 31,6 29,8 28,6 26,8 25,6 
 
Firstly, the average differential in the sample is of about 18,9% (women's 
earnings being about 18,9% lower than those of men)20. 
The regression of the log-earnings differential on education and 
experience yielded: 
 
DifLogWage = - 0,102 + 0,006 s - 0,005 t     (3.4) 
       (0,002)    (0,001) 
  R2 = 0,2 F(2,305) = 38,213 
 
This would suggest that the gap would start (no schooling, no 
experience) at a female 10,2% disadvantage relative to the male earnings 
level; a one year increase in education would diminish the earnings gap by 
0,6%, but an extra year of experience would increase it by 0,5%. Both 
coefficients are highly significant. 
In table III.6.1 we can analyze the evolution implied by these numbers: 
the differential for high levels of education is very small (0,6% for the 
highest degree of education) at the starting levels, but increases with the 
schooling levels and range between 20% to 35% at high levels of 
experience. 
 
Table III.6.2. Female-Male Earnings Differentials. (%) 
 Years of Schooling 
Experience: 0 4 6 9 11 14 16 
0 -13,0 -22,2 -25,6 -29,2 -30,6 -31,2 -30,6 
5 8,0 -1,2 -4,6 -8,2 -9,6 -10,2 -9,6 
10 21,9 12,7 9,3 5,7 4,3 3,7 4,3 
20 37,3 28,1 24,7 21,1 19,7 19,1 19,7 
30 46,9 37,7 34,3 30,7 29,3 28,7 29,3 
40 56,3 47,1 43,7 40,1 38,7 38,1 38,7 
50 63,4 54,2 50,8 47,2 45,8 45,2 45,8 
 
Other specifications were, thus, tried: 
DifLogWage = 0,13 + 0,027 s -0,001 s2 -       (3.5) 
             (0,002)   (0,001) 
  - 0,051 t + 0,002 t2 - 4,191E-5 t3 + 3,239E-7 t4  
  (0,013)     (0,001)     (2,315E-5)     (1,992E-7) 
  R2 = 0,344  F(6,301) = 26,313 
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The implied pattern of wage differentials can be examined in table 
III.6.2. At the initial experience levels (till 5 years) the estimated differential 
does not favor men. As we increase experience, the gap increases - 
decreasing with the schooling level - ranging between 38 and 63% in the 
highest experience levels. 
 
Table III.6.3. Female-Male Earnings Differentials. (%) 
 Years of Schooling 
 0 4 6 9 9T 11 14 16 
 29,1 29,8 14,5 12,3 12,8 14,3 11,1 20,0 
Experience:         
0 -16,1 -13,6 -28,1 -29,5 -28,5 -24,4 -27,2 -18,2 
5 4,4 6,9 -7,6 -9,0 -8,0 -3,9 -6,7 2,3 
10 17,6 20,1 5,6 4,2 5,2 9,3 6,5 15,5 
20 30,7 33,2 18,7 17,3 18,3 22,4 19,6 28,6 
30 36,3 38,8 24,3 22,9 23,9 28,0 25,2 34,2 
40 40,0 42,5 28,0 26,6 27,6 31,7 28,9 37,9 
50 40,3 42,8 28,3 26,9 27,9 32,0 29,2 38,2 
 
Other specifications included the use of dummy variables for education. 
The simple use of education dummies (no experience variables included) 
originated the pattern of the first line of Table III.6.3. This measures the 
simple mean differential between schooling categories. In the following 
lines we report the results when we include as well the quartic 
representation of experience (the 4-th term is almost significant at the 10% 
level) - of the several regressions performed in the log-earnings 
differentials, this showed the highest adjusted R2. 
In terms of schooling differentials only (first line) the highest gap is 
found at no schooling or primary school (29-30%). The gap decreases till 9 
years, jumps to 14% at 11 years, decreases at 11 years and jumps again to 
20% at "licenciatura". 
Controlling also for experience (the interaction between schooling and 
experience was not significant), using a quartic approximation for the 
experience profile, we see that schooling is not the cause of the differential 
in earnings (we have negative values at the initial experience). Rather, 
experience seems to be the cause of the negative differential  Interestingly, 
the differential seems to decrease with schooling (by experience level), but 
we see some increases at the highest levels as suggested by the results of 
the first line. Differences between high-school degree holders and technical 
school are not significant. 
Whether a segmented labor market interpretation for these findings may 
be appropriate is not explored here. Rather, given the limited information 
we have, only a quantitative statement of the observed differentials is 
presented 21.  
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5. Technical versus high-school systems 
1. In Table IV.1. and IV.2 we can see some evidence concerning 
differentials between high-school and technical systems. The unified 
system abolished the technical schools. We use a dummy variable (D91=1 if 
the individual completed the technical-school degree, 0 otherwise)  
 
Table IV.1. Male Earnings: Technical versus High-School Systems. 
 Independent Variables 
Group Int. Educ Educ2 Exp Exp2 Exp3 Edu*Ex D91 D91Exp D91Ex2 
1 Male 8.02 0.073  0.054 -0.001   -0.021   
  (0.002)  (0.002) (4E-5)   (0.024)   
 N= 392  R2 = 0.873  F = 663.3  SSR = 9.626 
2 Male 7.64 0.098 0.001 0.076 -0.001  -0.001 0.019 0.001 -2.5E-5 
  (0.006) (3E-4) (0.003) (4E-5)  (1E-4) (0.063) (0.006) (1E-4) 
 N= 392  R2 = 0.912  F = 493.6  SSR = 6.686 
3 Male 8.42   0.099 -0.003 2.28E-5     
S=9 years     (0.007) (3E-4) (4E-6)     
 N= 100  R2 = 0.913  F = 334.5  SSR = 0.798 
4 Male 8.42   0.097 -0.003 2.28E-5  0.007 0.003 -9.0E-5 
S=9 years    (0.007) (3E-4) (4E-6)  (0.057) (0.005) (1E-4) 
 N= 100  R2 = 0.915  F = 167.1  SSR = 0.776 
5 Male 8.45   0.091 -0.002 1.90E-5     
S=90 years     (0.009) (4E-4) (5E-6)     
(H.Sc.) N= 50  R2 = 0.927  F = 194.6  SSR = 0.329 
6 Male 8.40   0.106 -0.003 2.66E-5     
S=91 years     (0.01) (5E-4) (6E-6)     
(T.Sc.) N= 50  R2 = 0.905  F = 146.2  SSR = 0.439 
 
The dummy coefficient seems to indicate that individuals with a 
technical school degree earn slightly more than those with the equivalent 
high-school years, even if not significantly. (Notice that the dummy D91 
aggregates differences in the rate of return and in the intercept - initial 
earnings.) The technical school experience profiles, however, seem to be 
flatter, but not significantly, for men; the contrary seems to occur for 
women. 
 
Table IV.2. Female Earnings: Technical versus High-School Systems 
 Independent Variables 
Group Int. Educ Educ2 Exp Exp2 Exp3 Edu*Ex D91 D91Exp D91Ex2 
1  8.05 0.079  0.033 -4.1E-4   0.044   
Female  (0.02)  (0.003) (5E-5)   (0.029)   
 N= 308  R2 = 0.809  F = 321.0  SSR = 9.337 
2  7.78 0.107 -3.0E-4 0.047 -0.001  -0.001 0.071 -0.003 6.98E-5 
Female  (0.011) (5E-4) (0.004) (6E-5)  (2E-4) (0.094) (0.009) (2E-4) 
 N= 308  R2 = 0.822  F = 172.4  SSR = 8.711 
3  8.66   0.061 -0.002 1.35E-5     
Female    (0.014) (0.001) (8E-6)     
S=9 years  N= 85  R2 = 0.571  F = 35.92  SSR = 1.886 
4  8.60   0.069 -0.002 1.60E-5  0.081 -0.01 -2.2E-4 
Female    (0.015) (0.001) (8E-6)  (0.114) (0.01) (2E-4) 
S=9 years N= 85  R2 = 0.581  F = 18.05  SSR = 1.84 
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5  8.54   0.082 -0.002 2.36E-5     
Female    (0.019) (0.001) (1E-5)     
S=90 years(H.Sc.) N= 42  R2 = 0.598  F = 18.88  SSR = 0.844 
6  8.75   0.046 -0.001 6.47E-6     
Female    (0.02) (0.001) (1E-5)     
S=91 years (T.Sc.) N= 42  R2 = 0.576  F = 17.70  SSR = 0.971 
 
International evidence – collected in Psacharopoulos (1985) – suggests a 
smaller rate of return on technical/vocational curricula relative to the 
general, academic type. We found no such difference – if some is present, it 
seems to go in the opposite direction. One cannot infer from the findings 
here presented for Portugal whether the extinct technical school system 
was or not irrelevant - the results may simply indicate an equilibrium 
situation achieved with the simultaneous systems, each performing each 
function.  
2. We also used the log-earnings differentials approach used in section 
III. The earnings differentials are not very high, and neither the significance 
of the regressions performed for each sex: 
For men, workers with a technical school degree earned about 1,8% 
more than people with the equivalent high-school years. The earnings 
differential was negatively correlated with experience - even if not 
significantly. The regression of the difference of log-earnings gave the 
following results: 
 
 DLEarn(Tech-High) = 0,047 - 0,001 Exp 
           (0,001) 
 R2 = 0,024  F(1,48) = 1,185 
 
Using the Gompertz specification, the coefficients showed higher 
significance but the regression was not significant at the 10% significance 
level: 
 
DLEarn(Tec-Hig) = -0,068 + 0,511 e-0,05Ex - 0,513 e-0,05Ex
2
  
            (0,245)          (0,258) 
 R2 = 0,085  F(2,47) = 2,188 
 
For women, the differential was 1,5% and positively (not significantly at 
the 10% level) correlated with experience. A quadratic term in experience 
proved significant: 
 
 DLEarn(Tech-High) =  0,199 - 0,026 Exp +  0,001 Exp2  
            (0,013) (2,734E-4) 
 R2 = 0,15     F(2,34) = 2,999 (significant at 10% level) 
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The best regression for women with the Gompertz terms was significant 
at 10% but not at the 5% significance level: 
 
DLEarn(Tech-High) = -1,114 + 1,365 e-0,05Exp + 0,027 Exp 
                 (0,641)         (0,012) 
 R2 = 0,132  F(2,34) = 2,576 
 
6. Empirical specifications of the experience-earnings 
profiles 
Another application of log-earnings functions included the study of 
more complex experience profiles. If we may to some extent lose the 
interpretation in the above formulations, we may get more accurate 
descriptions of the patterns implied. 
A recent study22 concluded that in the U.S. a 4-th degree polynomial in t 
(experience) - a quartic rather than a quadratic specification - would give a 
more adequate representation of the male earnings profiles. 
 
Table V.1.1. Experience Profiles: Men 
 Independent Variables 
Regr./ Educ. Int. Exp Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 Exp5 Exp6 Ed Ed*Exp 
(1) 7.425 0.116 -0.003 4.60E-5 -2.86E-7   0.109 -0.001 
All  (0.009) (0.001) (2E-5) (1E-7)   (0.003) (1E-4) 
 N = 392 R2 = 0.921 F = 748.27  SSR = 5.972 
(2) 6.367 0.296 -0.012 2.3E-4 -1.55E-6     
0  (0.031) (0.002) (4E-5) (2.6E-7)     
 N = 52 R2 = 0.932 F = 160.013  SSR = 0.203 
(3) 2.682 1.196 -0.094 0.004 -8.10E-5 8.9E-7 -3.9E-9   
0  (0.128) (0.012) (0.001) (1.5E-5) (2E-7) (9.E-10)   
 N = 52 R2 = 0.978 F = 326.48  SSR = 0.067 
(4) 7.558 0.154 -0.005 7.05E-5 -3.9E-7     
4  (0.02) (0.001) (3E-5) (2.6E-7)     
 N = 52 R2 = 0.96 F = 280.023  SSR = 0.201 
(5) 7.821 0.073 0.003 -2.6E-4 5.77E-6 -4.2E-8    
4  (0.042) (0.004) (2E-4) (2.9E-6) (2E-8)    
 N = 52 R2 = 0.963 F = 242.25  SSR = 0.183 
(6) 7.54 0.215 -0.009 1.88E-4 -1.4E-6     
6  (0.015) (0.001) (3E-5) (2.5E-7)     
 N = 52 R2 = 0.974 F = 438.95  SSR = 0.187 
 
Table V.1.2. Experience Profiles: Men 
 Independent Variables 
Regr./ Educ. Int. Exp Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 Exp5 Exp6 Ed Ed*Exp 
(7) 8.344 0.128 -0.005 9.8E-5 -7.4E-7     
9  (0.013) (0.001) (3E-5) (3E-7)     
 N = 100  R2 = 0.918 F = 265.588  SSR = 0.75 
(8) 8.22 0.191 -0.014 0.001 -1.0E-5 7.47E-8    
9  (0.023) (0.003) (1E-4) (2.9E-6) (2E-8)    
 N = 100  R2 = 0.926 F = 236.197  SSR = 0.674 
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(9) 8.6 0.121 -0.006 1.4E-4 -1.4E-6     
11  (0.032) (0.003) (8E-5) (8.2E-7)     
 N = 48  R2 = 0.808 F = 45.275  SSR = 0.867 
(10) 8.807 0.01 0.009 -0.001 1.72E-5 -1.5E-7    
11  (0.056) (0.007) (4E-4) (8.0E-6) (7E-8)    
 N = 48  R2 = 0.83 F = 41.091  SSR = 0.767 
(11) 9.251 0.023 0.001 -2.9E-5 1.45E-7     
14  (0.033) (0.003) (1E-4) (1.2E-6)     
 N = 44  R2 = 0.662 F = 19.055  SSR = 0.926 
 (12) 9.182 0.044 -0.001       
14  (0.007) (2E-4)       
 N = 44  R2 = 0.649 F = 37.981  SSR = 0.959 
(13) 9.227 0.101 -0.004 7.08E-5 -6.4E-7     
16  (0.035) (0.003) (1E-4) (1E-6)     
 N = 44  R2 = 0.732 F = 26.568  SSR = 1.021 
(14) 9.313 0.07 -0.001       
16  (0.007) (2E-4)       
 N = 44  R2 = 0.722 F = 53.361  SSR = 1.056 
 
In fact, such finding in no way diminishes the explanatory power of 
human capital theory, only suggests that other patterns of investment 
rather than the linear or exponential patterns are observed. Moreover, 
Taylor expansion to higher degree for both forms would yield higher 
degree polynomials. The advantage of the second-degree polynomial forms 
is that they provide readily interpretations for the coefficients and implied 
estimates of initial investment, or rates of return to O.J.T., etc. In order to 
describe the pattern of compensation, other nonlinear forms can be 
applied23. 
 
Table V.2.1. Experience Profiles: Women 
 Independent Variables 
Regr./ Educ. Int. Exp Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 Exp5 Educ Ed*Exp 
(1) 7.714 0.067 -0.001 1.115E-5   0.1 -0.001 
All  (0.007) (2.7E-4) (3.1E-6)   (0.005) (1.8E-4) 
 N = 308  R2 = 0.827 F = 287.872 SSR = 8.481 
(2) 8.034 0.052 -0.001 1.102E-5     
0  (0.017) (0.001) (4.9E-6)     
 N = 49  R2 = 0.371 F = 8.861 SSR = 0.259 
(3) 4.63 0.686 -0.044 0.001 -2.00E-5 1.12E-7   
0  (0.152) (0.01) (3.3E-4) (4.9E-6) (2.8E-8)   
 N = 49  R2 = 0.554 F = 10.683 SSR = 0.184 
(4) 7.716 0.104 -0.003 2.97E-5     
4  (0.011) (4.3E-4) (4.8E-6)     
 N = 52  R2 = 0.867 F = 104.442 SSR = 0.407 
(5) 7.851 0.126 -0.004 3.58E-5     
6  (0.014) (0.001) (7.4E-6)     
 N = 47  R2 = 0.873 F = 98.411 SSR = 0.561 
(6) 7.572 0.203 -0.01 1.99E-4 -1.52E-6    
6  (0.032) (0.002) (6.3E-5) (5.8E-7)    
 N = 47  R2 = 0.891 F = 85.458 SSR = 0.483 
(7) 8.657 0.061 -0.002 1.35E-5     
9  (0.014) (0.001) (7.9E-6)     
 N = 85  R2 = 0.571 F = 35.919 SSR = 1.886 
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Therefore, some estimates were performed using higher order 
polynomials, for men and women for all the individuals and for each 
education group. The regression results are presented in Tables V.1 (men) 
and V.2 (women). The Gompertz specifications were also enlarged - Tables 
V.3 and V.4. 
 
Table V.2.2. Experience Profiles: Women 
 Independent Variables 
Regr./ Educ. Int. Exp Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 Exp5 Educ Ed*Exp 
(8) 8.792 0.055 -0.001 -2.05E-6     
11  (0.021) (0.001) (1.5E-5)     
 N = 36  R2 = 0.596 F = 15.727 SSR = 1.049 
(9) 8.52 0.218 -0.026 0.001 -3.64E-5 3.17E-7   
11  (0.077) (0.01) (0.001) (1.3E-5) (1.1E-7)   
 N = 36  R2 = 0.682 F = 12.874 SSR = 0.825 
(10) 9.397 0.023 -0.002 5.93E-5     
14  (0.055) (0.003) (5.3E-5)     
 N = 21  R2 = 0.446 F = 4.566 SSR = 0.682 
(11) 10.052 -0.207 0.021 -0.001 1.090E-5    
14  (0.118) (0.011) (4.08E-4) (5.1E-6)    
 N = 21  R2 = 0.57 F = 5.308 SSR = 0.529 
(12) 9.539 0.041 -0.001 1.421E-5     
16  (0.027) (0.001) (2.2E-5)     
 N = 18  R2 = 0.304 F = 2.041 SSR = 0.376 
(13) 9.588 0.025 -0.001      
16  (0.011) (2.6E-4)      
 N = 18  R2 = 0.284 F = 2.975 SSR = 0.387 
 
For each regression performed to the males data, we present the 4-th 
order polynomial in the experience proxy and (when a different degree 
offered better estimates) the polynomial form that gave the best fit 
(adjusted R2). The 4-th order gave the best fit for the sample as a whole, 
and only for the education group with 6 years of schooling (secondary 
school). For people with 
- no schooling, 6-th degree gave the best fit 
- primary schooling, 5-th degree gave the best fit 
- high-school (9-years), 5-th degree gave the best fit 
- complementary high-school (11 years), 5-th degree gave the best fit 
- B.A. and "licenciatura" (14 and 16 years), 2nd degree gave the best fit. 
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Table V.3.1. Gompertz - Men 
 Int E E2 Exp k0 rx (%) 
Years of Education:       
0 8.441 2.531 -4.789 0.008 3.095 0.91 
  (0.921) (0.826) (0.005)   
 N = 52 R2 = 0.927  F = 202.664 SSR = 0.217 
4 10.317 -1.725 -1.093 -0.019 1.479 10.83 
  (0.741) (0.544) (0.005)   
 N = 52 R2 = 0.958  F = 364.29 SSR = 0.21 
6 10.072 -0.386 -2.136 -0.014 2.067 5.93 
  (0.678) (0.45) (0.005)   
 N = 52 R2 = 0.97  F = 520.191 SSR = 0.214 
9 10.052 -0.536 -1.189 -0.01 1.542 6.74 
  (0.653) (0.404) (0.005)   
 N = 100 R2 = 0.919  F = 364.03 SSR = 0.738 
11 10.649 -1.849 -0.118 -0.016 0.486 24.02 
  (1.664) (1.005) (0.014)   
 N = 48 R2 = 0.798  F = 57.898 SSR = 0.913 
14 12.534 -5.536 2.292 -0.051   
  (2.007) (1.103) (0.019)   
 N = 44 R2 = 0.663  F = 26.265 SSR = 0.921 
16 12.087 -2.909 0.048 -0.042   
  (2.156) (1.181) (0.02)   
 N = 44 R2 = 0.731  F = 36.182 SSR = 1.024 
 
For women, the equivalent regressions suggested the use of a 3rd-degree 
polynomial for the sample as a whole, 4 years and 9 years of schooling. For 
the others: 
- no schooling, 5th degree 
- 6 years, 3rd degree 
- 11 years, 5th degree 
- B.A. (14 years), 4th degree 
- "licenciatura" (16 years), 2nd degree. 
The Gompertz regressions were first performed by education group in 
order to see whether some implied pattern for the (general) O.J.T. rate of 
return could somehow be deduced.  
The implied estimates for the male sample show a mixed pattern, with 
some trade-off with the initial endowment. For high schooling levels no 
real solution was found for k0 and rx. A 4th degree polynomial in the 
exponential term gave the best fit for the population as a whole, no 
schooling workers and 6 years of schooling.  
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Table V.3.2.1. Gompertz - Men 
Years of Ed. Inter. E E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Ed Ex Ed*Ex 
All 11.62 -9.572 16.738 -20.04 8.814   0.109 -0.038 -0.001 
  (3.63) (7.921) (8.86) (3.72)   (0.003) (0.01) (1.E-4) 
 N = 392 R2 = 0.922  F = 648.76  SSR = 5.895 
0 9.468 1.851 -23.92 62.097 -53.28    -0.009  
  (4.82) (14.9) (23.5) (14.0)    (0.012)  
 N = 52 R2 = 0.982  F = 510.32  SSR = 0.053 
4 13.574 -18.46 48.322 -72.00 38.185    -0.063  
  (6.559) (16.5) (21.4) (10.5)    (0.021)  
 N = 52 R2 = 0.971  F = 307.12  SSR = 0.145 
4 33.941 -159.3 764.76 -2339 4067.5 -3681 1339.4  -0.313  
  (20.88) (94.2) (270) (442) (379) (131)  (0.04)  
 N = 52 R2 = 0.993  F = 955.99  SSR = 0.033 
6 14.876 -19.999 40.153 -46.02 18.728    -0.084  
  (6.49) (14.8) (17.4) (7.671)    (0.022)  
 N = 52 R2 = 0.976  F = 372.51  SSR = 0.173 
 
Table V.3.2.2. Gompertz - Men 
Years of Ed. Inter. E E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Ex Ed Ed*Ex 
9 10.378 -0.687 -4.506 7.399 -4.412   -0.016   
  (7.13) (15.02) (16.4) (6.799)   (0.03)   
 N = 100 R2 = 0.923  F = 224.80  SSR = 0.705 
9 11.454 -5.055 5.024 -3.201    -0.032   
  (2.34) (3.12) (1.60)    (0.01)   
 N = 100 R2 = 0.922  F = 282.61  SSR = 0.708 
11 16.206 -23.75 46.132 -50.31 20.616   -0.099   
  (19.75) (40.3) (43.2) (17.59)   (0.08)   
 N = 48 R2 = 0.804  F = 34.519  SSR = 0.884 
11 41.665 -143.3 395.0 -650.3 543.52 -178.26  -0.456   
  (52.75) (149) (251) (216) (73.5)  (0.17)   
 N = 48 R2 = 0.829  F = 33.086  SSR = 0.773 
14 17.51 -23.99 38.618 -37.33 14.539   -0.127   
  (26.6) (49.0) (47.9) (18.0)   (0.12)   
 N = 44 R2 = 0.669  F = 15.395  SSR = 0.904 
14 44.663 -140.6 343.26 -513.8 396.53 -120.7  -0.524   
  (77.07) (195) (300) (238) (75.09)  (0.27)   
 N = 44 R2 = 0.691  F = 13.796  SSR = 0.845 
16 6.881 18.763 -48.98 56.008 -23.63   0.033   
  (28.58) (52.1) (50.6) (18.97)   (0.13)   
 N = 44 R2 = 0.755  F = 23.431  SSR = 0.932 
16 16.379 -15.211 14.751 -6.793    -0.115   
  (8.566) (9.985) (4.58)    (0.05)   
 N = 44 R2 = 0.745  F = 28.499  SSR = 0.97 
 
For women (Tables V.4.1 and V.4.2), a 2nd-degree term usually 
performed better. The results imply a pattern of the rate of return to O.J.T. 
and initial investment which indicates (as expected) that the pattern may 
not be of the Gompertz type. 
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A 1st-degree polynomial seems to be sufficient for the sample as a 
whole. For women with no schooling and a B.A., a 4-th degree polynomial 
is best, and a 5-th term is includable for women with primary schooling. 
For these categories, the experience term is positive. This suggests the use 
of a form with the experience terms, rather than with the Gompertz 
specification. 
The implied pattern for all women suggests (Table V.4.2) an initial 
investment of 74,7% of initial earnings potential and a rate of return to 
O.J.T of 12,9% - which compares with 100% (for initial investment) and 
7,3% (rate of return) implied by specification (4) of tables III.1 and III.2, 
where we got a much smaller rate - the interaction of experience with 
education yields, thus, different estimates. 
 
Table V.4.1. Gompertz - Women 
Years of Education Int E E2 Exp k0 rx (%) 
0 8.084 2.234 -3.162 0.009 2.515 0.56 
  (1.332) (1.343) (0.007)   
 N = 49 R2 = 0.412  F = 10.503 SSR = 0.242 
4 7.669 3.195 -3.539 0.022 2.660 -1.01 
  (1.019) (0.748) (0.007)   
 N = 52 R2 = 0.871  F = 107.766 SSR = 0.397 
6 8.404 2.563 -3.457 0.014 2.629 0.13 
  (1.287) (0.869) (0.01)   
 N = 47 R2 = 0.891  F = 117.678 SSR = 0.479 
9 9.842 -0.697 -0.546 -0.009 1.045 8.33 
  (1.396) (0.881) (0.011)   
 N = 85 R2 = 0.572  F = 36.141 SSR = 1.879 
11 12.357 -5.167 1.635 -0.058   
  (2.665) (1.514) (0.025)   
 N = 36 R2 = 0.592  F = 15.449 SSR = 1.06 
14 4.59 8.008 -3.178 0.115 2.521 -10.88 
  (7.346) (4.061) (0.074)   
 N = 21 R2 = 0.401  F = 3.798 SSR = 0.737 
16 10.742 -1.209 0.018 -0.021   
  (3.194) (1.723) (0.031)   
 N = 18 R2 = 0.299  F = 1.987 SSR = 0.379 
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Table V.4.2. Gompertz - Women 
Years Educ. Inter E E2 E3 E4 E5 Ex Ed Ed*Ex 
All 9.122 -1.182 -0.279    -0.006 0.101 -0.001 
  (0.664) (0.432)    (0.005) (0.005) (1.8E-4) 
 N = 308  R2 = 0.827 F = 288.126  SSR = 8.475 
All 9.294 -1.601     -0.009 0.101 -0.001 
  (0.149)     (0.002) (0.005) (1.8E-4) 
 N = 308  R2 = 0.826 F = 360.75  SSR = 8.487 
0 3.766 30.219 -117.44 232.626 -173.34  0.062   
  (12.98) (44.38) (79.12) (53.61)  (0.031)   
 N = 48  R2 = 0.591 F = 12.406  SSR = 0.168 
4 -6.456 81.258 -283.62 584.55 -612.93 249.89 0.207   
  (26.22) (91.76) (188.5) (195.9) (79.55) (0.065)   
 N = 52  R2 = 0.895 F = 63.757  SSR = 0.323 
14 -92.586 330.39 -563.7 532.56 -199.36  1.7   
  (114.2) (206.8) (206.3) (81.45)  (0.547)   
 N = 21  R2 = 0.631 F = 5.133  SSR = 0.454 
 
Finally, we point out the fact that the education coefficient of the best 
regression for men and women now show a smaller rate of return to 
schooling for females than for males at each schooling level. 
 
7. Some final remarks 
1. We interpreted the results in terms of standard human capital theory, 
associating 
- schooling with investment through education. 
- experience with general O.J.T. 
Earnings functions may have other interpretation than that advanced in 
section I. 24. The positive effect of schooling in earnings can be associated 
with signaling effects. A positive relation between tenure (and, thus, 
because we have no data on tenure, experience which is positively 
correlated with it) and earnings can be explained by implicit contract 
theories without human capital theory. Therefore, our results may have 
something of both sources. Also, hedonic wage functions may have been 
found, in which case, we have a mixture of supply and demand 
considerations in the formation of an empirically observed relation 
between the variables. 
Also, as observed before, some segmented labor market interpretations 
maybe applicable for the earnings and returns differentials observed 25. We 
preferred to offer a quantitative account of the latter. 
2. The results may suffer from ability bias (usually considered to bias 
estimates of rates of return upwards), self-selection (usually causing a 
downward bias), or other problems 26, some explained along the exposition 
and in the Appendix. Nevertheless, the results seem to show a good fit to 
the data - and most biases cannot be corrected without more information 
regarding other variables. 
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8. Summary and conclusions 
We performed some estimates - made for other countries - of log-
earnings regressions specifications with the available data for the 
Portuguese labor force. We can summarize the main conclusions as follows: 
1. The estimates of the rates of return to schooling for the male sample 
indicate a convex pattern - that is, an increasing rate of return with the 
schooling level. The average rate of return to schooling is (was in 1977) 
about 7,3%. 
2. Male experience profiles indicate much higher rates of return for 
O.J.T. -13-15%. (Notice, however that general and specific O.J.T may be 
causing these high values, once we have no information on tenure and a 
positive correlation must exist between tenure and experience.) 
3. Results for women indicated an average rate of 8% and a decreasing 
profile of schooling rates of return. Rates of return to O.J.T. are much lower 
than for men - which may be partly attributed to the bad proxy for female 
experience available. 
4. Wage differentials by sex indicate a substantial difference between 
men and women, the data suggesting the negative difference relative to 
men comes from experience price and not from the schooling reward. 
(Again, these results are clouded by the bad proxy for experience of 
women. Caution must therefore be taken when interpreting these issues as 
symptoms of discrimination.) 
5. When we consider estimates by age groups, we get a declining pattern 
of returns to schooling with groups age; this occurs even when 
age/experience within the group is controlled for. 
6. The extinct technical school system does not show significant 
differences in the pattern of rewards relative to the high-school system. 
7. A quartic representation of the earnings-experience profile seemed to 
be adequate for the male sample. A cubic representation was achieved for 
women. 
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Notes 
 
1  Although the primary interpretations adopted in the paper are in consonance with 
standard neo-classical theory, some complementary references of segmented labor market 
literature are also presented in the treatment of this subject. 
2 This seems a reasonable assumption (specially in private terms), once education is heavily 
subsidized. Also, compared to opportunity costs - that is, of foregone income due to the 
fact that the individual is using time to study instead of working -, those costs are small. 
Notice that these costs are sometimes (at least partly) supported by parents, and not by the 
individual himself; so in private terms the assumption is even more accurate (assuming a 
setting where schooling of children is viewed as utility-yielding-consumption by parents 
and not in an intergenerational transfer context). Part-time income of students is also not 
accounted for, which would also off-set part of the money costs of schooling. 
3 Using the fact that we are summing the terms of an infinite geometric series. 
4 See Mincer (1974). 
5 See, for example, Weiss (1986). As is well known, earnings regressions maybe interpreted 
in an hedonic framework - see Rosen (1974) and Willis (1986). 
6  The estimates from earnings regressions are usually lower than those obtained by direct 
methods - see Willis (1986). 
7 See Mincer, op. cit. 
8 See Mincer, op. cit. 
9 See Soares, Pedro & Magalhães (1984). 
10 In the comparisons we will present, we sometimes refer to results for the U.S. in which log 
of weeks worked during the year by the individual were included in the regression. We 
have no corresponding information - and use mean data on individuals, assuming the 
mean week would be the same for every class considered. 
11 Notice that we cannot exclude the possibility of 7,3% being still a very high rate. Kula 
(1985) presents an estimate of 7,2% for the Portuguese rate of time preference (However, 
the interest rate maybe higher than this rate - see MaCurdy (1981)). 
12 See Asplund, Barth, Le Grand, Mastekaasa & Westergård-Nielsen (1991), were rates of 
return for Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland are reported. Only for Finland do the 
estimates approximate our result of 7%, with 4 and 5% for the other countries. 
13 See Mincer, op. cit. 
14 See Mincer, op. cit. 
15 See the Appendix: this could come from the fact that we are not using after-tax earnings, 
the tax system being convex. 
16 Experience-earnings profiles as implied by Human Capital theory could also be explained 
in an implicit contract theory context. The increasing earnings over the life-cycle would be 
associated with the need to keep workers in their jobs, delaying payments (but rewarding 
them at the prevailing interest rate). Specific human capital investments, associated with 
tenure on the job - related to experience in the labor market and of which both us and 
Mincer had no information about - would thus be preserved. Then, the flatter profile in 
Portugal could be due to implicit contracts implying a smaller necessity for postponing 
payments to keep employees, due to the smaller (job) mobility of the Portuguese labor 
force. 
17 See Freeman (1986) for a discussion of the problem and a survey of relevant literature. 
18 See, for example Asplund et al, op. cit. 
19 See Cain (1986). See also and Tzannatos (1990) for a survey of the literature. 
20 Recall that the data we have - see the Appendix - refers to mean earnings for each 
category. To know the correct mean difference, we should weight by the percentage of 
people in each cell, but such information is not available. 
21 See Taubman & Wachter (1986) and McNabb & Ryan (1990) for recent surveys. Also, see 
Hartog & Vriend (1990), and Magnac (1991) for an attempt to distinguish the two 
hypothesis (neo-classical and segmented labor market). This same comment applies to all 
the differential approaches. 
22 Murphy & Welch (1990). 
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23  We could have also experimented using earnings - and not log of earnings - as de 
dependent variable. Foreign evidence suggests that the log-earnings specifications are the 
ones that have provided the best predicting power of earnings profiles. See Freeman 
(1986) for further references. 
24 See Willis, op. cit. 
25 See footnote 21. 
26 See Willis, op. cit. 
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Appendix 
1. The data used was published in Soares, São Pedro & Magalhães (1984). There, 
we find tables - one for men and another one for women - of mean monthly 
earnings of individuals by age and schooling categories for 1977. The data is based 
on the annual survey "Quadros de Pessoal" conducted by the Labor Ministry. 
2. We constructed experience - as in Mincer (1974) - by subtracting, from the 
age, the schooling years and 6 (initial schooling age). That is for individuals of class 
i: 
 
Experiencei = Agei - 6 - Years of Educationi                (A.1) 
 
3. We considered the following equivalence in terms of schooling years relative 
to the category of schooling for which mean earnings level by age was reported: 
 
 No Schooling     0 years 
 "Primário"     4 years 
 "Preparatório"     6 years 
 "Secundário Liceal"    9 years 
 "Secundário Técnico"    9 years 
 "Secundário Complementar"  11 years 
 "Universitário (3 anos)"   14 years 
 "Universitário (5 years)"  16 years 
 
In the text, we used the term B.A. for the 14 years degree - even if the 
correspondence is not completely accurate. The higher degree (16 years) is referred 
to as "licenciatura". 
Notice that nowadays an extra schooling year has been created - the "12º Ano" - 
between High-School and University. However, such was not the case at (till) the 
time - 1977. 
We abstracted from the fact that some people may have taken more than those 
years to complete that schooling level - therefore experience may be over-estimated 
by the index (A.1), even if people always worked since leaving school. If the over-
approximation is homogeneously (additively) distributed among the population, 
this will not affect the estimates. 
Also, some people did not complete a schooling category and have more years 
of schooling than the adjacent lower category. This implies that we overestimate 
schooling and, implicitly, underestimate experience. Again, this will only affect the 
estimates of the rates of return in some special cases. 
4. The information on earnings reported does not correspond to net private 
earnings - recall §.4 of section I -, but, to our knowledge, they are the only available 
(published) information at the moment. Being the tax system progressive, this will 
yield a tendency towards overestimation of the rates of return to schooling. This 
could also be related to the finding of a positive correlation between the rate of 
return to schooling and the schooling level for men, the overestimation being, thus, 
increasing with the schooling level. 
5. The data refers to monthly earnings - the earnings that we should use would be 
annual. We assume that annual earnings are a fixed multiple of monthly earnings, 
that is: 
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Eannual = Emonthly x 14       (A.2) 
 
Therefore, in log-earnings terms: 
 
ln Eannual = ln Emonthly + constant.       (A.3) 
 
This implies that, apart from the intercept, the interpretation of the coefficients in 
the regressions will not be altered. 
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